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It is uncontroversial that the doctrine of striving (conatus) as our actual essence forms the basis 
for Spinoza’s ethical project proper. Slightly after the beginning of the third part of his mas-
terpiece, Spinoza declares: “Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being” 
(3p6, translation modified). I will start by delineating the context of the principle, after which 
I will provide a reading of the two propositions that contain the very core of the theory. This 
in turn will enable me to explain how Spinoza’s theory of conatus is connected to his views on 
appetite, desire, activity, and teleology. 
The view that animate things naturally strive to preserve themselves had for centuries 
been part and parcel of Western philosophy most importantly through the teachings of Stoics, 
for whom the impulse (hormê) to self-preservation forms the basis of a naturalistic ethics. Still, 
the intellectual landscape had altered by Spinoza’s time in a radical way with the breakthrough 
of the new mechanical sciences: most importantly, the teleological view of the way in which 
the world and things in it were ordered was under strong pressures to which Spinoza was quite 
sensitive. In brief, naturalistic ethics had to be rethought given the questionability of final 
ends. 
The way in which Spinoza’s conatus principle is formulated betrays its debt to the first 
Cartesian law of nature, “each thing, insofar as it is in itself, always continues in the same 
state” (Principles of Philosophy II.37; CSM I, 240, translation modified). It also seems to echo 
Hobbes’s metaphysics, according to which everything is ultimately explicable in terms of mo-
tion, the small beginnings of which is endeavor. Neither of these doctrines contain anything 
teleological in their basic elements. This, together with Spinoza’s ardent denial of divine tele-
ology (1app), gives reasons to think that Spinoza believed the conatus theory to be, in its essen-
tials, unencumbered by teleological metaphysics. Be this as it may, it can be safely said that the 
conatus principle expresses in a new intellectual climate Spinoza’s view of the doctrine that is 
part of a long and venerable tradition concerning the natural operations of things. 
The crucial twin propositions—3p6 and p7—are written in Spinoza’s trademark con-
densed style. We should pay attention not only to their argumentative ancestry, referred to in 
the demonstrations, but also to their progeny, especially to what Spinoza takes himself to be 
entitled to derive directly from them. 3p6 is the nexus through which certain key tenets of the 





For singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain 
and determinate way (by 1p25c), i.e. (by 1p34), things that express, in a certain 
and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts. And no thing has 
anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence away 
(by p4). On the contrary, it is opposed to everything which can take its existence 
away (by p5). Therefore, as far as it can, and it is in itself [quantum potest, et in se 
est], it strives to persevere in its being, q.e.d. (3p6d, translation modified) 
 
The demonstration, which consists of four elements, has been the topic of a lively discussion. 
Jonathan Bennett’s criticism set its orientation in the sense that Spinoza was widely seen to 
derive 3p6 from the immediately preceding conceptual considerations (i.e., 3p4–p5) alone. 
Perhaps because the notion of power—long in disrepute—has recently been rehabilitated in 
analytic metaphysics, the beginning of the demonstration invoking God’s power does not feel 
as otiose as it did before; be this as it may, that the demonstration builds on Spinoza’s dyna-
mistic tendencies seems to be nowadays not only quite widely acknowledged but regarded 
sympathetically. Obviously, we are dealing with a power that strives against opposition, and that 
power certainly must, in Spinoza’s framework, have God as its source. Obviously, Spinoza 
combines 1p25c with 1p34 to claim that finite expressions of an essentially powerful or causal-
ly efficacious God are endowed with conatus. Here he seems to think that the very notion of 
expression brings with it the idea that expressions (here: finite things) retain the basic charac-
ter of what they express (here: God). Thus, given that God is essentially powerful, expressions 
must be so too. 
Even if the argument for the conatus principle were not as airtight as some would like, the 
aforesaid shows that, within his framework, Spinoza has solid grounds to think that he has 
given his readers enough reasons to endorse the principle. The next point he wants to drive 
home is that we are not dealing with a garden-variety feature of things: “The striving by which 
each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing” (3p7). 
In other words, things are strivers by their very essence or nature. For Spinoza’s intended audi-
ence, the appearance of the notion of essence is hardly a surprise: the previous proposition 
does, after all, state that any thing strives to persevere in its being insofar as it is in itself (‘quan-
tum in se est’), which refers precisely to the thing’s essence or nature. Moreover, keeping in 
mind that the concept of essence figures in the immediate ancestry of the conatus principle 
(3p4d), the ground is already prepared for the notion to do real work. In 3p7d, Spinoza first 
reminds us that things are causally efficacious, or powerful, by their essences alone (by 1p29 
and 1p36); thus, as power, striving is equated with the essence of things. The essence in ques-
tion is precisely the actual essence (essentia actualis) presumably because conatus is the power 
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at play in constantly varying circumstances of temporal existence—the contrast being with the 
unchanging and eternal formal essence (essentia formalis) of things. In other words, if little of 
what Spinoza says in the opening part of the Ethics involves anything temporal, the conatus 
principle specifies the way in which intrinsically powerful finite things act under the unswerv-
ing influence of other finite things or, to put it in Spinoza’s idiom, “external causes.” 
With regard to the progeny of the conatus propositions, I would like to highlight four el-
emental points that make their presence felt through the rest of the Ethics. First, Spinoza 
defines a number of psychological items in terms of striving: 
 
When this striving is related only to the mind, it is called will; but when it is re-
lated to the mind and body together, it is called appetite. This appetite, therefore, 
is nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily fol-
low those things that promote his preservation. And so man is determined to do 
those things. Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire 
is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetites. So de-
sire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness of the appetite. (3p9s) 
 
Appetite (appetitus) is thus the general term for conatus of the mind and body (recall 2p7) of 
any finite thing; appetites of which we are consciously aware Spinoza calls desires. Precisely 
they figure prominently in Spinoza’s theory of affects or emotions: the very first definition of 
affects explains that “by the word desire I understand any of a man’s strivings, impulses, 
appetites, and volitions, which vary as the man’s constitution varies, and which are not 
infrequently so opposed to one another that the man is pulled in different directions and 
knows not where to turn” (defaff1). Clearly, Spinoza is sensitive to the fact that our existence 
is often a troubled affair, and his view of the dynamics of actual existence is firmly based on 
the idea that as our essential striving is directed in varying ways, we desire different things.
Second, striving is intimately linked to what is good to us: “From all this, then, it is clear 
that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be 
good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, 
and desire it” (3p9s). It is not altogether clear what the “all this” is from which this should be 
clear; presumably, that willing, desiring, and so on are all forms of conatus introduced a few 
propositions earlier, but there is no shortage of interpretative leeway. However, it would be, I 
think, very difficult to deny that here Spinoza goes decidedly against one central feature of 
traditional teleological models, namely against what may be called the thesis of intrinsic 
normativity. According to Spinoza, people mistakenly believe in final causes as independent 
goods because they maintain “that the gods direct all things for the use of men” (1app). In 
other words, Spinoza sees such final causes as part and parcel of a misguided providential 
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worldview in which God has a grand plan, very much centered on the welfare of human 
beings, which dictates that there are intrinsically good things “for the sake of which he [God] 
willed to prepare the means” (1app). In this framework, given the ends chosen by God, things 
with natures suitable to produce those ends must be created. In this brand of essentialism, 
final causes as intrinsic goods are ontologically prior to essences, for they determine the kind of 
essences there must be. But Spinoza’s essentialism is of a decidedly different type: God’s 
production of finite things as modifications involves no choice or planning, and the essence of 
those modifications, in turn, is the striving that manifests itself as desires and appetites, the 
objects of which are judged good. Thus, “[w]hat is called a final cause is nothing but a human 
appetite insofar as it is considered as a principle, or primary cause, of some thing” (4pref); our 
striving determines what is judged to be good in the first place. 
Third, Spinoza signals that the conatus principle amounts to what may be called power 
enhancement. This is expressed in 3p12 and p13, which are not only notable in themselves but 
also the veritable testing stone for any interpretation of the conatus doctrine. They read as 
follows:  
 
The mind as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the 
body’s power of acting. (3p12) 
 
When the mind imagines those things that diminish or restrain the body’s power of 
acting, it strives, as far as it can, to recollect things which exclude their existence. 
(3p13) 
 
What does he have in mind here? Let us take a look at the argument for the latter proposition: 
 
So long as the mind imagines anything of this kind, the power both of mind and of 
body is diminished or restrained (as we have demonstrated in p12); nevertheless, the 
mind will continue to imagine this thing until it imagines something else that 
excludes the thing’s present existence (by 2p17), that is (as we have just shown), the 
power both of mind and of body is diminished or restrained until the mind imagines 
something else that excludes the existence of this thing; so the mind (by p9), as far as 
it can, will strive to imagine or recollect that other thing. (3p13d) 
 
The demonstration begins by reminding us that the power of mind and body go hand in hand. 
The middle part of the demonstration states that when the mind thinks about something that 
decreases its power, it cannot but continue thinking about it unless there is something else 
that takes it away. As the reference to 2p17 indicates, this claim is based on the mechanist 
strain in Spinoza’s psychology. The final part of the demonstration is the most interesting 
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one: based on 3p9, which in turn is based on the conatus principle, the mind will strive to 
imagine that which opposes the thing which we think decreases our power. The claim is thus 
that our mind does not rest content continuing with the power-decreasing thought but strives 
to get rid of it. It is thus understandable that 3p12 and p13 are commonly read as saying that 
we strive to increase our power; however, it is worth keeping in mind that the conatus 
principle itself is reminiscent of the Cartesian law of motion that is about continuing in the 
prevailing motion, whatever it may be. 
That conatus amounts to, in many if not most circumstances, striving for power-
enhancement is confirmed by a much later definition central for Spinoza’s whole ethical 
enterprise and with a direct reference to the conatus propositions: “By virtue and power I 
understand the same thing, that is (by 3p7), virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is the very 
essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things, which 
can be understood through the laws of his nature alone” (4d8). 
But things, or effects, “which can be understood through the laws” of a human being’s 
nature alone are actions: “[W]e act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we 
are the adequate cause, that is (by d1), when something in us or outside us follows from our 
nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone” (3d2, emphasis added). 
The only conclusion to draw is that our striving is not merely about persevering in the 
prevailing state but about asserting our nature and what follows from it as much as possible. In 
fact, were this not true, it would be difficult to see on what Spinoza’s ethical project, heavily 
stressing activity as it does, is based. 
Fourth, on the basis of the general conatus principle, Spinoza sets out to overturn familiar 
views of human action. As we have seen, much in the conatus doctrine revolves around natures 
or essences. We have also seen that the idea behind the claim that striving is our actual essence 
is that essences are causally efficacious, and the very same idea underpins the notions of 
appetite, desire, and virtue. To put things in the least controversial terms, things as strivers 
constantly produce effects—that is, they constantly act in the non-technical sense of the 
term—and to the extent that those effects follow from their own nature alone, they are active, 
whereas when strivers produce effects in conjunction with other causes they are (at least 
somewhat) passive. But the analysis above shows that Spinoza’s theory of action also contains 
much more controversial ideas. The way in which a certain property (e.g., fulfilling the 
Pythagorean theorem) follows from the essence of a figure constituted in a certain way (e.g., from 
a triangle that is right-angled) sets the Spinozistic paradigm for our the determination of our 
specific strivings; a certain desire always corresponds to a certain constitution of our essence. 
Moreover, finite things—human and nonhuman alike—strive to do more than just prolong 
their psychophysical existence; they strive to be active, that is, to produce effects that can be 
conceived through their own essence alone. They do this simply because from any given 
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essence, considered in itself, certain effects follow or “flow” as properties. Here geometrical 
objects provide the model: from their essences properties were seen to necessarily follow (see 
1p17s). 
Indeed, the view that activity consists fundamentally in bringing about effects that follow 
from an essence allows Spinoza to account for human activity while rejecting the notion that 
we are pulled, as it were, by the intrinsic goodness of things. Of course, Spinoza admits that 
things can be called “good”—but this judgment of goodness depends on our striving, rather 
than the other way around (3p9s). Still, even if our essential striving determines what is good 
in the first place, one might well ask whether or not this kind of striving to realize one’s own 
nature is teleological. It is not teleological in the traditional “full-blown” sense that ends would 
be involved in structuring or determining our essences (as they were in the Peripatetic 
framework where all things had their place in the grand providential plan); what we call ends 
are things that simply flow from our essences, those essences in turn being what they are 
because they follow from God’s nature.  
However, less robust senses of Spinozistic teleology have been presented and defended. If 
teleology is, for instance, understood not as a doctrine concerning the very makeup of things 
but merely as a form of explanation which proposes to explain things by their (probable) 
effects, it would be difficult—and probably unnecessary—to deny that the conatus doctrine 
allows teleological explanations. Most famously, “[w]e strive to further the occurrence of 
whatever we imagine will lead to joy, and to avert or destroy what we imagine is contrary to it, 
or will lead to sadness” (3p28) seems rather straightforwardly to license explaining at least 
some of our strivings in terms of their consequences. What is distinctive about Spinoza’s 
account, though, is that he is able to reconcile this minimal sense of teleology as acting for the 
sake of something with the essence–property model of causality by reducing final causes to 
appetites, or manifestations of one’s striving. Thus, while there is still a lively scholarly debate 
concerning whether or not Spinoza endorses teleology, and if he does in what sense, there can 
be no doubt that he at the very least profoundly problematizes the familiar teleological picture 
of human action. 
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